kataib hizbollah

nujaba / kaabi

• nothing

sayyid al shuhada / abu alaa

• nothing

Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya

• nothing

Islamic resistance

Paris and Berlin rolled out the red carpet for Prime Minister Ali Al Zaidi during his three-day tour of Europe concluding September 16th, where Al Zaidi met with high-level French and German business delegations in addition to respective heads of state.

What was discussed?

Arriving in Paris on September 13th during the first leg of his journey, Al Zaidi’s first meeting took place with executives of French energy giant ‘Total Energies’, which discussed plans to more than double Iraq’s current oil production to ten million barrels per day over the next five years, as well as develop its natural gas infrastructure to end overreliance on imports.

The following day Al Zaidi met with French President Emmanuel Macron at the Élysée Palace for the the public signing of six memoranda of understanding:

• Letter of intent between the Iraqi Ministry of Defence and the French AI company ‘Harmattan AI’ for strategic cooperation in air defence.

• Declaration of intent between the Iraqi Ministry of Defence and the French Ministry of the Armed Forces to acquire French military equipment to develop Iraqi defence capabilities.

• Declaration of intent between the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs for partnership in “youth opportunities”, research and innovation.

• Declaration of intent between the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its French counterpart to strengthen partnership with the French Development Agency (AFD).

• A protocol of cooperation between the Iraqi Ministry of Electricity and Total Energies for the production and sale of natural gas.

• Declaration of intent and cooperation in the field of civil aviation between the Iraqi and French Ministries of Transport.

Al Zaidi continued on to Berlin on September 15th for the second leg of his European official visit, meeting German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, signing the fourth phase of Iraq’s existing “Energy Cooperation Principles Agreement” with the German technology giant - Siemens.

Following the signing between Siemens and the Iraqi Ministry of Electricity, Al Zaidi and Chancellor Merz delivered a press briefing in which Al Zaidi said candidly regarding the Strait of Hormuz:

“Iraq cannot remain hostage to a single corridor, as has just happened to us.”

Whilst laying out the following short to medium-term strategic objectives:

• Doubling Iraq’s net oil exports to 9-10 million barrels a day over the next five years

• Diversifying Iraq’s buyers from its current overreliance on South Asian markets via the Strait of Hormuz to include European and Western nations

• Exporting half of its prospective 9-10 million daily barrels of production to European and Western markets by land rather than sea routes

• Ongoing expansion of Cihan Pipeline to 1.5 million barrels a day

• Increasing exports [via trucking] through Syria to 1 million barrels a day

• The possibility of exploring a direct pipeline from Iraq to Germany to hedge against future crisis scenarios

Speaking later in the day at the German-Iraq Business Dialogue Forum to representatives of some of Germany’s largest companies, Al Zaidi pledged exclusive privileges for German companies and citizens who establish operations in Iraq, including:

• A 10-year tax and customs exemptions on German companies

• Visa-free travel for German citizens

• Automatic ownership of Iraqi land on which German companies have their operations

Reaction from Badr Organisation

The Badr Organisation is the sixth largest parliamentary bloc and third largest Shia-Islamist bloc with 18 seats and 2 cabinet ministries - the Ministry of Transport and Ministry of Water Resources. Led by Hadi Al Ameri, it also happens to be the only major parliamentary bloc still retaining an active armed wing in the form of the Badr Brigades, after the Al Sadiqoun bloc (with 27 seats) disbanded their armed wing Asa’ib Ahlul Haq earlier this year.

The head of the Badr Organisation’s ‘political bureau’ Muhammad Naji Muhammad, condemned Ali Al Zaidi’s visit in a Twitter post made September 16th, for including a meeting with representatives of the French financial services company Rothschild & Co. on the French leg of the visit. Muhammad pointed to Iraq’s 2022 ‘Anti-Normalisation’ law “Banning the Normalization and Establishment of Relations with the Zionist Entity Law” noting that Al Zaidi had met with Rothschild & Co.’s supervisory board member, Édouard de Rothschild - an Israeli citizen.

Muhammad’s statement was unusually strong given the convention within the Shia Coordination Framework (‘CF’) of moderating public criticism against fellow CF members, saying:

“From the short period that has passed since Brother Al-Zaidi took office, it has become clear that he does not respect the issues that contradict the public opinion of the Iraqi people.”

Implications

Al Zaidi’s comments in Berlin of Iraq being “hostage” to the Strait of Hormuz cuts against a conventional wisdom of Iraq’s ‘friendly’ relationship with Iran. While media reports in recent months have suggested special exemptions for Iraqi access through the Strait of Hormuz, ongoing suspected-Iranian attacks against Iraqi cargo point to a shakier reality between Tehran and Baghdad.

While reduced - but still significant - quantities of Basra crude flow through the strait with tentative Iranian permission, Baghdad also faces pressure from Washington to disarm Iran-backed militias operating within Iraqi territory. Washington’s push for militia disarmament therefore risks pushback from Iran in the form of further restrictions on Iraqi cargo through the Strait of Hormuz - something Baghdad can hardly afford given its ongoing fiscal crisis.

Compounding issues, American threats to restrict Iraq’s access to its dollar-denominated oil revenues have been widely reported by local media, despite being officially denied by prime-ministerial advisor Mazhar Mohammed Saleh. Twin US-Iranian pressures therefore force Baghdad into a choice between its access through the strait, and access to the dollar.

Al Zaidi’s European visit therefore represents an attempt to create room to manoeuvre in its delicate balancing act between Iran and the US. Alternative export routes primarily weaken Iran’s hand in Baghdad’s disarmament negotiations with Iran-backed militias operating within its borders. By undercutting Iranian leverage through the strait, Baghdad hopes to keep dollars flowing to its coffers while intensifying disarmament negotiations with pro-Iran parties and militias.

The Badr Organisation’s public rebuke of Al Zaidi’s visit therefore reflects a tacit understanding among pro-Iran political and armed factions of this calculation.

Sanctions

Following several weeks of defiant public statements from leadership figures of Shia political blocs and armed groups, the US Treasury made its opening moves last week against Kata’ib Hizbullah (KH), the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) and several associated companies. In a press release published September 9th, the US Treasury’s ‘Office of Foreign Assets Control’ (OFAC) announced new sanctions which included four Iraqi KH members, a senior official of the PMF, two Iraq-based companies and a third Iraqi-owned UAE-based company:

Individuals

• Ali Hasan Farhan Al-Lami - Senior KH Commander

• Abbas Jawad Kadhim Al-Tameemi - Senior official of the PMF’s Directorate of Technical Equipment

• Hussein Ahmed Hussein Al-Dhuhaibawi - KH Member

• Mohamed Ameen Fadhil Ali Al-Shaikhli - KH Member

• Karrar Mohammed Qasim Al-Hraishawi - KH Member

Companies

• Al-Brouj For General Contracting Company Ltd - PMF procurement contractor

• Ain Al-Iraq For Protecting Technology and Audio, Visual, and Communications Solutions Company Ltd - PMF procurement and logistics contractor

• Shams & Bahr Trading Company L.L.C. - Hawala money transfer provider based in the UAE moving funds between Iraq and Iran.

The companies’ key principals were also listed in the sanctions package.

Implications

The US Treasury’s choice of sanction targets reflects a pivot of strategy by Washington towards driving a wedge between the Iraqi state institution of the PMF on the one hand, and Iran-backed actors of the ‘Islamic Resistance’ on the other, through financial pressure rather than kinetic action.

OFAC’s sanctions to date have notably not included the PMF itself as an institution, which has so far escape both US sanctions and terror designations since its inception in 2016. The latest round of sanctions similarly targets specifically those actors which Washington deems to be an extension of Iranian influence inside Iraqi institutions and involved in kinetic action against US interests. In this case, Kata’ib Hizbullah, a major pillar of the Iran-backed ‘Islamic Resistance in Iraq’ umbrella of armed groups. The Treasury’s choice of the PMF’s ‘Directorate of Technical Equipment’ is similarly tied to it being led by former KH official and designated terrorist Salah Mahdi Hantush al-Maksusi, first sanctioned back in 2012.

If successful, Washington hopes for these measures to turn up pressure on Shia political leadership, and officials within the PMF itself, to take a harder line on the disarmament of noncompliant Iran-backed militias, such as KH and Harakat Hizbullah Al Nujaba (HHN), rather than continue to pursue a consensus compromise which leaves these groups with their arsenal of weapons. Already struggling to pay salaries due restrictions in the Strait of Hormuz, Iraq’s federal government can hardly afford for these sanctions to spread to other sectors of the economy, forcing a choice between civil unrest and militia disarmament.

Forcing Baghdad’s hand does however come with its own risks. Even if Baghdad decides to take a less compromising position towards noncompliant militias to save its economy, there is no guarantee that a threat of action by Iraq’s federal government will sufficiently coerce Iran-backed militias into disarmament without an outbreak of violence.

Suspected Iraqi militias continue strikes on Saudi energy infrastructure

Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline, which has acted as a vital workaround since disruption in the Strait of Hormuz, came under attack on September 10th by suspected Iran-backed militias operating out of Maysan Province, Iraq. Severe damage inflicted to the pipeline’s pumping stations has since resulted in its closure - which the Saudi Ministry of Energy described as merely a “precautionary” measure. The pipeline however remains offline. This comes after joint US-Saudi air forces struck PMF and ‘Islamic Resistance’ militia sites inside Iraq back in July killing and wounding several dozen personnel - itself a retaliation to similar attacks against Saudi energy infrastructure launched from inside Iraqi territory at the time.

Coordinated statements released by the Media Office of the Iraqi Prime Minister and the Saudi Foreign Ministry on September 11th, expressed that Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Al Zaidi had personally requested Riyadh not to retaliate on this occasion, but rather, give Baghdad the opportunity to deal with the issue internally. The Saudi Foreign Ministry expressed that Riyadh had accepted this request and had,

“chosen not to respond at this stage and to support the efforts of the Iraqi government”

while affirming that it,

“reserves its right to take all necessary measures to safeguard its sovereignty and security”

The Media Office of the Iraqi Prime Minister for its part expressed its appreciation towards the Kingdom for its restraint and willingness to entrust Baghdad with investigating the matter and pursuing the perpetrators and individuals involved in the attack.

Iraqi action against attack

Follow-up statements by the Media Office of the Iraqi Prime Minister later in the evening of September 11th, announced the opening of an investigation into the Maysan Province Operations Command, the dismissal of its Police Commander, and transfer of the heads of security agencies for Maysan Province pending the investigation.

Official statements by the ‘Islamic Resistance in Iraq’, the broader umbrella of Iran-backed militias, notably denied any involvement in the attacks despite glorifying them. Local media citing Iraqi security officials suggested that the perpetrators were not ‘formally’ part of the Islamic Resistance, and had entered into Iraqi territory from Iran before launching their attacks and escaping back into Iran.

Statements released by the Iraqi government’s ‘Security Media Cell’ also announced the closure of 3 out of 5 of Iraq’s border crossings with Iran pending the enhancement of security protocols due to “breaches and violations that occurred at these crossings”, while also laying out timelines for their reopening.

Implications

Riyadh and Washington’s response to the latest attacks launched from Iraqi territory against Saudi energy infrastructure sit in stark contrast to their decision just over a month ago to launch airstrikes, displaying further signs of a pivot towards a carrot-and-stick strategy in dealing with Baghdad and Iran-sponsored actors. Official denials of involvement by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq additionally reflects their desire to hold on to political concessions squeezed out of the Coordination Framework in recent weeks (in negotiations on disarmament) rather than be implicated in new escalations.

Although Riyadh and Washington might not find much consolation in Baghdad’s piecemeal attempts to take action against Iran-sponsored attacks launched from Iraqi territory, they increasingly understand the risk of kinetic action pushing Shia political leadership and Iran-backed militias closer together in a zero-sum game. This strategy also signals US-Saudi cautiousness in further undermining Iraqi central government authority, which they would rather draw closer to the US-Saudi position than weaken relative to Iran-backed actors.

Saudi Arabia and Washington can hardly afford to lose Al Zaidi as a friend in Baghdad in the absence of better options - even if Al Zaidi is far from an ideal friend. The US and its Middle East allies increasingly understand that they will have to work through Iraq’s formal state security institutions if they are to prevent Iran-backed actors from using Iraq’s territory to threaten its neighbours, rather than acting unilaterally against such actors as they have done historically.

Prominent leaderships figures of Shia political parties and militia movements appear to be converging on a consensus regarding their approach to the US’s ultimatum for militia disarmament by September 30th. As the deadline moves closer, political and militia leadership seek to shift the focus from outright disarmament of Iran-backed militias, to a focus on distancing Iran-backed militias from the state institution of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF).

Diversion and rebranding is unlikely to satisfy US demands, raising near-term sanctions risk on Iraqi public and private individuals and institutions.

Who said what

Nouri Al Maliki

Al Maliki heads the ‘State of Law Coalition’, the second largest parliamentary bloc and largest element of the broader ‘Coordination Framework’ of Shia political blocs and parties. Al Maliki gave an interview to Al Sharqiya, released on September 4th, where he stated categorically and repeatedly that the objective with respect to Shia armed factions had shifted from “disarmament” to “regulation”, warning against an approach which would unnecessarily humiliate militias in a way which makes their cooperation less likely.

When asked directly about the issue of Shia militias operating inside the state institution of the PMF, Al Maliki responded:

“We do not tolerate the existence of militias in the PMF, this is what we’re here to resolve. The militias are one thing and the PMF is another”

When pressed on what will become of the militias after their dissociation from the PMF, Al Maliki responded:

“…They stay, as they have existed before. Some militias have transitioned into politics. Others will stay as militias…but, but, will not be permitted to give orders to [units in] the PMF”.

Hadi Al Ameri

Al Ameri heads the Badr Organisation, the third largest Shia parliamentary bloc (after ‘State of Law Coalition’ and ‘Al Sadiqoun’), and by far the largest parliamentary bloc which still maintains an active armed wing in the form of the ‘Badr Brigades’ militia. The Badr Organisation also notably holds two ministries in Prime Minister Ali Zaidi’s cabinet, in the form of the Transport and Water Resources ministries.

After initially showing some receptivity to disarming the Badr Brigades in statements made in December 2025, Al Ameri changed his tone sharply after joint US-Saudi airstrikes against PMF and Shia militia sites in late July of this year. Al Ameri publicly challenged the framing of US and regional pressure for disarmament in a speech delivered to supporters of the Badr Organisation on August 29th. Speaking at the memorial ceremony of Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, Al Ameri stated:

“it is completely impossible that [Ali Ali Zaidi] will choose a confrontation with the Resistance”

and that:

“The issue if disarmament, or more appropriately and correctly, the regulation of arms…is not an external decision, but an exclusively Iraqi one, and we refuse any foreign interreference in this matter”

Ali Al Assadi

Al Assadi sits as the ‘chairman of the political council’ of the Iran-backed Shia militia Harakat Hizbullah Al Nujaba (HHN). Although not represented formally by a parliamentary or political bloc, HHN form one of two Iran-backed militias most active in kinetic operations against the US and its allies in the region - the second being Kata’ib Hizbullah (KH). Both HHN and KH have publicly rejected calls for disarmament and vowed to continue their activities against the US and its allies in various statements released over the past six months.

Al Saadi made public his ongoing meetings with unnamed representatives of the Coordination Framework in a statement released September 4th, in which he reaffirmed the Islamic Resistance’s position of retaining its weapons in exchange for ceasing its involvement in the PMF, and refraining from participation in formal politics. Speaking on behalf of HHN, Al Saadi echoed statements made by Al Ameri and Al Maliki in the preceding days saying:

…we clarified and stated our position on preserving the existence of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) as a national institution that cannot be interfered with, as well as our position on the Islamic Resistance and the sanctity of its weapons.”

“In light of these discussions, we reaffirmed our approach of not participating in the political process.”

Al Saadi’s statement also claimed that Al Nujaba’s proposals has been positively received and considered by the Coordination Framework.

[Full translation]

_{“With God’s help, we have concluded our visits to the brothers who are leading figures in the political process within the Coordination Framework. During these meetings, we clarified and stated our position on preserving the existence of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) as a national institution that cannot be interfered with, as well as our position on the Islamic Resistance and the sanctity of its weapons. Our position has not changed in light of the real and serious risks and threats facing the country and the region, nor regarding the means of confronting and responding to them. In light of these discussions, we reaffirmed our approach of not participating in the political process. This approach is what keeps us close to our people: we live through what they live through, carry their concerns, and strive to fulfil their demands. This responsibility remains upon us until comprehensive change is achieved—change that guarantees sovereignty, security and prosperity, strengthens our economy against American dominance, and ensures stability in the country’s internal situation. We also would not miss the opportunity to thank the leaders of the Coordination Framework for the engagement, understanding, and warm welcome they showed toward our positions and ideas, which they received with friendliness and brotherly spirit. We thank everyone for this level of responsibility and hospitality.”}

Implications

The underlying motivation behind Washington’s demands is the need to neutralise actors within Iraq’s borders who act outside the chain of command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Iraqi Armed Forces. Baghdad’s alternative proposal therefore aims to shift the focus from ‘disarmament’ to a focus on the PMF’s own integrity, and depriving noncompliant Iran-backed militias of the PMF’s institutional cover.

This notably however does not address Washington’s key concern and leaves HHN and KH with their arsenal of weapons, albeit deprived of PMF support. Given that joint US-Saudi strikes in July appear to have pushed the Coordination Framework and Islamic Resistance closer together, Washington is likely to revert back to targeted financial pressure to drive a wedge between these two power centres. This will likely come in the form of sanctions on Iraqi public and private institutions and individuals associated with noncompliant militias operating under the Islamic Resistance umbrella.